

TASK CLOSE OUT DOCUMENT

Task Scope REVIEW SHORT TERM TMI-2 CONTROL
ROOM & SITE EVACUATION CONTINGENCY
PLAN C-26 Rev. 0

To: M. Levenson
S. Levy
E. Zebroski

Task No. —

Date Complete 4-11-79

Reason felt task is complete:

This contingency plan was recommended by an earlier committee.
The plan was reviewed relative to the views of that committee
and was for the most part consistent with those views.
Some suggestions for changes and additions were provided.

Members of Committee

RICK MUENCH

(EARLIER COMMITTEE: YARRONSO,

KAHENAN, PALUDINO, HOLMAN)


Signed
Committee Leader

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REVIEW OF

"SHORT TERM TMI-2 CONTROL ROOM & SITE EVACUATION

CONTINGENCY PLAN C-26" REV. 0

INDUSTRY ADVISORY GROUP

166 032

INTRODUCTION

The report was reviewed relative to discussions amongst IAG members on this subject. These discussions resulted in two IAG reports: "Degradation Sequence Study" and "Relative Safety (of alternate cooling method)". The former report concluded that a procedure such as C-26 was a high priority item. There was, however, no consensus on which cooling mode it was most desirable to be in when the control room was evacuated: 1) One RCP running/heat removed via steam generator, or 2) natural circulation or 3) RHR. The latter report concluded that mode #1 was the safest most reliable followed by modes #2 and #3 respectively. Procedure C-26 was reviewed with that criteria in mind.

COMMENTS & QUESTIONS

Action #6

What flow rate will be set on the makeup pump? It is assumed that the minimum flow rate necessary to accomplish a pressurizer level increase will be used. This seems appropriate.

Action #7

Is the LPI aligned with the BWST originally or is it aligned in a normal decay heat removal mode?

If it is aligned to BWST, is it set up to automatically switch to normal decay heat removal? Sump? The system is designed to take suction from the sump after the BWST is discharged. This will allow operators maximum time to get back to the control room.

Action #8

If the seal water was still supplied to one RCP (perhaps P2A) there would be maximum probability of being able to start that pump again later. This compromise to Action 8 is recommended.

Action #12

RCP PIA tripped automatically on 4/6. Should automatic pump trip be locked out?

GENERAL COMMENTS

1. This procedure only discusses site evacuation when the current cooling mode is via one RCP and one steam generator. It should be expanded to include the case where you start from a natural circulation mode.

A suggestion would be to re-establish cooling by one RCP and one steam generator and proceed with the rest of Plan C-26. Also actions 13 - 16 assume a steaming generator. You may be water solid. Any difference?

2. This is a good procedure. The reliability of the one RCP/one steam generator cooling mode is enhanced by starting the emergency feedwater pumps. This provides a back-up in the secondary system to loss of a pump. The back-up in the primary system is natural circulation.

R. Muench

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INFORMATION ON THE RELATIVE SAFETY OF
ALTERNATE COOLING MODES

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Safety requires the availability of the following

COOLING MODE

	1) RC Pump	Nat'l 2) Circ.	3) HPIS	Boiling 4) Nat'l Circ	LP 5) RHR	Cont 6) Floo
Offsite Power	X			Nucleate		
Onsite Power		X(?)	X	X (?)	X	X
Steam Generator	X					
Non-leaking Steam Generator		X		X		
Feedwater Flow	X	X		X		
Stable core configuration	X			X		
Control Room	X	X		X		
Pump seal flow or Pump seal cooling water	X	?				
Non-leakage of						
Pump Seals		X		X		
RV seal		X		X		
Sampling lines		X		X		
Instrument lines		X		X		
P.S. Pressure -300psi	X	?				
Let down System	X (?)	close it	operable	close it		
In-core Instrumentation	X	X	X	X	X	
Closed Pressurizer Vent Valve		or make up X		make up needed	X	
Unbreached containment			X			X
Fire free containment			X			
Containment spray			X			X
Upgraded RHR					desired X	
Out of core instr.	X	X	X	X Keep subcooled	X	

*P-diological Assessment Group to verify safety

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